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A WORLD ELSEWHERE: 
SECESSION, SUBSIDIARITY, 
AND SELF-DETERMINATION AS 
EUROPEAN VALUES
Timothy William Waters
Professor of Law and Associate Director of the Center for Constitutional 
Democracy, Indiana University Maurer School of Law
Brutus
There’s no more to be said, but he is banish’d
As enemy to the people and his country.
It shall be so.
All PleBeiAns
It shall be so, it shall be so.
CoriolAnus
You common cry of curs, whose breath I hate
As reek o’ th’ rotten fens, whose loves I prize
As the dead carcasses of unburied men
That do corrupt my air – I banish you!
. . .
                                         . . . Despising,
For you, the city, thus I turn my back;
There is a world elsewhere.
– Coriolanus, III.iii, 124-30, 140-2
There is a deep-seated, deeply felt if not necessarily deeply reasoned 
line of opposition to the very idea of secession. The division of a state 
is seen as the abandonment of shared commitments and values, a 
Article received on 04/12/2015; approved on 08/01/2016.
This paper is based in part on a lecture entitled ‘People Live in Places: Secession, Subsidi-
arity, and the Assumptions behind Rigid Borders,’ which I gave at the Institut d’Estudis 
Autonòmics, Barcelona, 18 June 2015. My thanks to Dr. Carles Viver and Mercè Corretja 
Torrens for the invitation to give that lecture and to write this essay, as well as to mem-
bers of the audience that day for their valuable comments, and to Prof. Susanna Mancini, 
Christiana Mauro, and an anonymous reviewer for truly helpful suggestions and critiques.
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retrograde step – failure and worse than failure. Here, for example, 
is J.H.H. Weiler, one of the most prominent scholars of international 
and European law, criticizing Catalan secession as an offense against 
the European Union and European values: 
It is simply ethically demoralizing to see the likes of Catalonia reverting to 
an early 20th-century post-World War I mentality, when the notion that a 
single state could encompass more than one nationality seemed impossible. 
...diametrically contrary to the historical ethos of European integration... The 
very demand for independence from Spain, an independence from the need 
to work out political, social, cultural and economic differences within the 
Spanish polity, independence from the need to work through and transcend 
history, disqualifies morally and politically Catalonia and the likes as future 
Member States of the European Union... In seeking separation, Catalonia 
would be betraying the very ideals of solidarity and human integration for 
which Europe stands.1
Now, this strikes me as profoundly misguided – exhibiting hostil-
ity, even animus against secession – and if only because of the prom-
inence of the individuals who say such things, that animus, if not 
merits, then at least warrants a reply. This is especially true because, 
although I have quoted the comments of one scholar, he is by no 
means the only one singing from this harsh text: In less colourful form, 
it is the same view one can hear in Brussels and in various capitals; 
certainly, the core political consequence of this view – that secession 
is beyond the European pale and rightly removes the seceding com-
munity from the Union – is common and nearly canonical.2
It is also mistaken. In this essay, I want to show two things: first, 
that secession is in fact fully consistent with European values – and 
specifically the values of the European Union; and second, that we 
1. Joseph Weiler, “Catalonia’s Independence and the European Union,” EJIL Talk!, 20 
Dec. 2012, http://www.ejiltalk.org/catalonian-independence-and-the-european-union/ .
2. EU Commission President Manuel Barroso voiced his opposition to secession, for ex-
ample. But certainly this view is not universal: Many prominent scholars support the 
idea of secession as a viable possibility, and see no contradiction with being European, 
as debates on fora like Verfassungsblog, or indeed the comments to Weiler’s original 
post suggest. Yet even those favourable to the idea acknowledge the weight of the 
consensus: “Of course the default legal position seems to be that, upon independence, 
the EU Treaties simply no longer apply...” Piet Eeckhout, “Scotland and the EU: Comment 
by Piet Eeckhout,” Versfassungsblog, 9 September 2014, http://verfassungsblog.de/en/
scotland-eu-comment-piet-eeckhout/. I use Weiler’s text as a convenient point of focus 
because it is so prominent and so strongly argued, but I think anyone familiar with the 
debate knows that skepticism about the merits or propriety of secession is widespread, 
is indeed the politically dominant view.
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have – or could have – a means for realizing those values in interna-
tional law and politics generally.
My point is general, not applicable only to Catalonia – it is, in 
fact, part of the larger project I am working on to define and defend a 
right of secession. Whether or not that model, in its full detail, would 
specifically benefit the minority of Catalans now attempting to secede 
from Spain is an open question – but in its general outlines, the idea 
certainly does provide support for the sort of thing they believe it is 
their right to attempt. It suggests that Catalans and others who wish 
to pursue a separate political destiny ought to be able to try, and 
succeed or fail, as Europeans and within Europe. Given the level of 
opposition they face both legally and politically, not only within Spain 
but within the broader European Union and the global community 
concerned with international law, that is no small thing.
1. 
...with all our devotion to our role an uneasy feeling grows in us that we have 
travelled past our goal or got on the wrong track. Then one day the violent 
need is there: Get off the train! Jump clear! A homesickness, a point before 
the thrown switch put us on the wrong track. And in the good old days when 
the Austrian Empire still existed, one could in such a case get off the train 
of time, get on an ordinary train on an ordinary railroad, and travel back to 
one’s home.
There, in Kakania, that state since vanished that no one understood. 
... All in all, how many amazing things might be said about this vanished 
Kakania!.
   – The Man without Qualities3
Before we turn to that first question in full, let us look more 
carefully at the professor’s comments. I don’t think ‘animus’ too 
harsh a term – it reflects the vitriol with which he advances his argu-
ment: the full text refers to a “frenzy for secession and independ-
ence”, associates Catalan independence with the “mindset” of the 
“poisonous logic of national purity and ethnic cleansing”, and calls 
secession “irredentist Euro-tribalism which contradicts the deep val-
3. Robert Musil, The Man without Qualities, Sophie Wilkins, trans., Vintage International, 
1996, pp. 28-9.
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ues and needs of the Union.”4 Nor does this concern only Catalonia 
– in a later post, Weiler uses nearly identical language to criticize the 
Scottish independence movement – rather it is a general critique of 
secession in Europe.5
Of course, that might just be describing reality – after all, we 
have words like ‘frenzy,’ ‘poisonous’ and ‘tribalism’ for a reason. Each 
reader, and each observer of things in Catalonia (or Scotland), will 
have to decide for himself. Surely there are some Catalan secession-
ists who exhibit such negative attitudes, who traffic in questionable 
grievances and slanted histories, but that tells us little. There are 
such people everywhere, just as everywhere one finds people given 
to categorically dismissing those whose ideas they disagree with in 
the worst possible terms, people standing by with a bucket of tar, 
or perhaps of blood.
But if we restrict ourselves to more formal, analytical claims, we 
can see several themes: 
•	 Catalan	secession	is	somehow	a	reversion	to	a	mentality	as-
sociated with the interwar period, and in particular with the 
idea that a multi-national state is impossible.
•	 This	mentality	contradicts	the	idea	of	European	integration,	
and indeed of human integration more generally. 
•	 There	is	an	obligation	to	work	within	the	existing	Spanish	
polity, and to transcend history, which the Catalan secession 
movement is failing to fulfil.
4. Weiler, “Catalonia’s Independence and the European Union.” The reference to ethnic 
cleansing is immediately qualified, though in a way that reinforces the association: “I am 
not suggesting for one minute that anyone in Catalonia is an ethnic cleanser. But I am 
suggesting that the ‘go it alone’ mentality is associated with that kind of mindset.” Id. 
5. Prior to the Scottish referendum, Weiler took “a similarly dim view of the Scotland case 
[as of Catalonia,]” and using often verbatim language, spoke of a “frenzy for secession 
and independence in Europe” premised on an assumption that new states will find a 
safe haven in Europe, and repeats his arguments about “that poisonous logic of national 
purity and ethnic cleansing” and the “mindset” of ethnic cleansing, and saying that the 
debate in Scotland “runs diametrically contrary to the historical ethos of European inte-
gration.” The view is somewhat more moderate, however, accepting that Scotland could 
seamlessly join the Union as an independent state: “I do not think a real interregnum 
would be necessary. The would-be independent Scotland could negotiate her accession 
in her current status, go through all the European constitutional hoops save the final 
signature of the Act of Accession. That can be planned to take place, literally on the very 
same day that Scotland becomes formally an independent State.” Weiler, “Scotland and 
the EU: A Comment.”
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•	 The	failure	to	meet	those	obligations	makes	Catalonia	unfit	
for European Union membership, which suggests clear crite-
ria an independent Catalonia would fail to meet. 
•	 Finally,	all	of	this	is	an	ethical	matter,	a	question	of	European	
values – “rooted in the Christian ethic of forgiveness”6 – and 
not only for Catalonia, but for other communities like it.
These are quite serious claims, if also – as with most questions 
of values – hard to pin down with precision. But they are no less seri-
ous for that – those obligations to transcend history, for example may 
not be clearly explicated, but that does not mean they do not matter.
First, what exactly is this reversion? To assign something to the 
interwar period is, inevitably, to colour it with suspicions of degrada-
tion, decline and decadence; it might be heady – flappers, the Jazz 
Age, the Berlin of Cabaret – but it is going to end badly. Of course, 
the people living then did not call it the interwar period; they called it 
the post-war period, or something like that, because they lived in their 
own time, not in ours, which they called the future. They were feeling 
their way, muddling through – a great principle of Europe before the 
Great War and still today.
The new, notionally mono-national states of Central and Eastern 
Europe succeeded to the great antebellum empires (which of course 
did not know they were antebellum any more than their successors 
knew they were interwar). I myself feel a considerable nostalgia for 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and have often thought that, whatever 
its faults, it was in many respects a great deal better than what came 
after; but I am not sure it is a model for how we wish to live today. 
And it is certainly not the model for how we do: whatever one thinks 
of them, the states formed out of the cataclysm of the Great War – 
with further, brutal modifications after the Second – are in fact part 
of the matrix and the map of the present European Union, whereas 
the great multinational empires are not. Precisely because of their his-
tory – some as products of the interwar era, others of the earlier state-
building phase in Western Europe – the states of the European Union 
rank among the most ethnically homogenous states in the world, as 
6. Joseph Weiler, “Catalonia’s Independence and the European Union.” The identical 
language appears in Joseph H.H. Weiler, “Scotland and the EU: A Comment,” Verfas-
sungsblog, 8 September 2014, http://verfassungsblog.de/en/scotland-eu-comment-joseph-
h-h-weiler/.
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close as we get to nation-states in the technical sense.7 So it cannot be 
the actual existing states and their ‘mononationalism,’ but rather the 
‘mentality’ that is the problem: that problematic mentality is clearly 
the idea of secession itself – the creation of new states.
How then does making new states contradict the idea of Euro-
pean integration, or human integration more generally? The European 
Union has 28 members, and although its translation services suffer ex-
ponentially heavier workloads whenever new languages get added, 
the precise number of members (so long as it is two or more) is abso-
lutely irrelevant to the Union’s conceptual framework. If anything, the 
tremendous growth in the Union’s membership suggests that having 
more members is part of the project. If there is any actor contemplating 
shrinking the Union, it is those in the Commission and various capitals 
who insist that a secessionist region must be expelled; certainly the 
secessionists in Catalonia and Scotland are not looking to get out.
Nor is there any absolute direction or valence to the European 
Union as an integrative project; as British objections show, the goal 
of ‘ever greater union’ may be in the treaty, but is not in fact a uni-
versally shared value. (Let us pause to reflect on the irony that seces-
sionist Scots are more likely to support the European Union than are 
English supporters of British union). And whatever level of integration 
we contemplate, it is between x number of states joined in a com-
mon union through a treaty: Nothing in the project requires a direct 
merger of two or more sovereigns, and nothing – except for politics, 
of course – would prevent one sovereign from becoming two and still 
integrating in the Union.8
As for human integration, in the last hundred years the number 
of states has increased roughly four-fold, as the great imperial and 
7. See Max Fisher, “A Revealing Map of the World’s Most and Least Ethnically Diverse 
Countries,” Washington Post (May 16, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
worldviews/wp/2013/05/16/a-revealing-map-of-the-worlds-most-and-least-ethnically-
diverse-countries/ (showing the most ethnically homogenous countries clustered in Eu-
rope, with sub-Saharan African states generally exhibiting the greatest ethnic diversity). 
Of course, the mere incident of relatively greater homogeneity says nothing about at-
titudes or polices. All the major Catalan separatist parties advocate a civic nationalism 
that includes Spanish speakers, for example.
8. Secession would contradict integration in only one particular circumstance: the actual 
merger of all European Union members into a single sovereign. There is no evidence, 
however, that that is a formal goal, and if it were proposed, it would be vigorously op-
posed by many otherwise committed members of the present Union.
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colonial empires collapsed.9 Just since the end of the Cold War, more 
than 20 new states have been created, several of which have joined 
the European Union. (For someone arguing that we need a right of 
secession, as I do, this is an awkward fact, since we seem to be creating 
new states on the same amount of land all the time). It may be that 
creating more states violates some principle of human integration, but 
it hardly contradicts actual human practice.
Talking about the interwar period inevitably makes one think of 
Nazis; presumably this is the endpoint of the ethnic cleansing mind-
set we are to associate with secession. The problem of course – apart 
from the general problem that equating one’s opponents with Hitler 
usually signals the end of useful argument – is that the Nazis actually 
were European integrators par excellence. Not, to be sure, according 
to the same values that animate the European Union, but it just goes 
to show that integration is not necessarily good, nor is it the only hu-
man value we should care about.
Coloratura aside, there is a troubling teleology in insisting that 
secession is retrograde – something wrong with co-locating present 
events in the past. Saying something is backwards implies something 
else is forwards, and we rarely need look farther than the speaker to 
figure out what that something else might be. Surely the truth – a 
truth Europeans who remember the 20th century should appreciate 
better than anyone else – is that there is no Direction to History, that 
it is lower-case through and through. Such progress narratives are 
problematic, since if secession is salient today – and clearly it is – we 
could just as well claim that the interwar period was prefiguring 
the present (which, if anything, is a more defensible formulation). 
Better just to say it is a bad idea, at that time, this, or any, if that is 
what one feels.
But we cannot escape the past so easily, it seems: There is also 
‘the need to work out political, social, cultural and economic differ-
ences within the Spanish polity, and ‘the need to work through and 
transcend history.’ What are these obligations to the Spanish state, 
and to history?
It is true that the Catalan National Assembly has been proceeding 
with a secessionist program – aiming to prepare for independence in 
9. See “Member States: Growth in United Nations membership, 1945-present,” United 
Nations, http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml (not showing the many states 
created in the interwar period).
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18 months – 10 that brings it into conflict with Spain’s constitution and 
government; secession clearly violates numerous constitutional provi-
sions on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Spain.11 And they 
are doing so despite not ever having actually secured a clear majority 
vote on a clear question about independence:12 the current program is 
based on a mandate secured in parliamentary elections, in which the se-
cessionist parties pledged to pursue a common independence platform 
– but those parties have considerable differences on economic, social 
and other policies, and were also elected to govern the existing region 
within Spain, so that mandate is ambiguous. Rule of law is one of the 
values of the Union,13 and we all ought to be troubled by a too-casual 
disregard for the prevailing constitutional and legal order.
At the same time, we should also be troubled by any obligation 
that prefigures all possible outcomes. There is effectively no scope 
within the Spanish polity for the idea that Catalans might ever work 
out their differences with Spain by exiting. State authorities have 
10. Ashifa Kassam, “Catalonia MPs vote for secession as Spain looks to block plans in court,” 
The Guardian, 9 November 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/09/catalo-
nia-mps-to-vote-on-secession-plan-in-showdown-with-spains-government (noting that the 
legislation contemplates creation of a tax authority and social security system, and that 
the National Assembly will not be bound by review by or decisions of Spanish authorities). 
11. Const. Spain (1978, rev. 2011), Sec. 1.2 (“National sovereignty belongs to the Spanish 
people, from whom all state powers emanate.”); Sec. 2 (“The Constitution is based on 
the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all 
Spaniards”); Sec. 8.1 (”The mission of the Armed Forces... is to... to defend [Spain’s] territo-
rial integrity and the constitutional order.”); Sec. 19 (“Spaniards have the right to freely 
choose their place of residence, and to freely move about within the national territory.”); 
Sec. 139 (“No authority may adopt measures which directly or indirectly hinder freedom of 
movement and settlement of persons and free movement of goods throughout the Spanish 
territory.”); Sec. 153 (identifying the Constitutional Court and Government as exercising 
“[c]ontrol over the bodies of the Self-governing Communities”). Many other provisions are 
relevant to the entirely uncontroversial view that Catalonia’s unilateral secession would 
violate Spain’s constitution. For example, Secs. 143-158 regulate the autonomous com-
munities and define their competences, which clearly do not include any power to declare 
independence, and specify numerous competences reserved to the Spanish state.
12. This is the standard in Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at ¶ 100, 
as the “initial impetus” for negotiations on secession.
13. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union Art. 2, 2010 O.J. C 83/01 (“The 
Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equal-
ity, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belong-
ing to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which 
pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women 
and men prevail.”) The argument I advance here is focused principally on democracy and 
rule of law, but other values – freedom, human dignity, human rights and minority rights 
are equally relevant.
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constitutional authority to prevent secession;14 the only possible path 
would require the agreement of the Cortes Generales,15 but that is 
universally understood to be out of the question. If we say, ‘you must 
work within the Spanish order,’ the result is pre-determined: There 
will not, cannot be secession.
I think it is a conundrum. It is important – it is one of those values 
Weiler would expound, and I agree – to remain within the bounds of 
law, to be ruled by law; and this, clearly, the Catalan separatists have 
now begun to move beyond. Yet given the resistance of the Spanish 
state, the National Assembly’s declaration is a logical step, and logi-
cally there must come a point at which the bounds of law no longer 
constrain, because the propriety and rightness of that constraining 
authority is the very thing at issue. One cannot insist that a majority 
of Catalans must answer a clear question, but then prohibit the asking 
of it – yet this is what the Spanish state has done.
In the ideal case, there would be only one thing that we would 
allow to be decided outside the purview of the state: the decision to 
secede itself, with a clear majority answering a clear question. That, by 
its nature, is a question that is not and cannot be subject to the consti-
tutional order, because it aims to reconstitute that order.16 But all else – 
choices about how to govern, rather than if to – should, ideally, be taken 
within the existing order, or in the new order only after the decision 
to secede is taken. So it is of great concern that the Catalan separatists 
have begun doing many things that are matters of governance, and 
14. Const. Spain (1978, rev. 2011), Sec. 155 (“If a Self-governing Community does not fulfil 
the obligations imposed upon it by the Constitution or other laws, or acts in a way that is 
seriously prejudicial to the general interest of Spain, the Government, after having lodged 
a complaint with the President of the Self-governing Community and failed to receive 
satisfaction therefore, may, following approval granted by the overall majority of the 
Senate, take all measures necessary to compel the Community to meet said obligations, 
or to protect the abovementioned general interest”). The government has already taken 
measures to assert control over financial matters in response to the National Assembly’s 
secessionist program. See Tobias Buck, “Catalan leaders angry at Madrid’s tightened 
financial control,” Financial Times, 24 November 2015, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/
f0868ab8-92bc-11e5-bd82-c1fb87bef7af.html#axzz3sTIStnor. 
15. Const. Spain (1978, rev. 2011), Sec. 90 (providing for the regulation of referenda, 
and giving the Senate power to veto a referendum text); and Sec. 92 (“Political decisions 
of special importance may be submitted to all citizens in a consultative referendum.” 
[emphasis added]).
16. It can be, in the sense that a constitution can allow for secession, as the United King-
dom does. But a constitutional order cannot properly or completely provide for unilateral 
secession in violation of its own order, and as a matter of international law, a constitution 
that actually prohibits secession cannot in fact fully regulate or exclude the question.
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not the decision itself. At the same time, this choice is understandable, 
because it is not sensible to declare independence when one has not 
built even the minimum apparatus to govern. The preparations that 
Catalonia is undertaking are the sorts of things any state needs to have 
in its control – which is precisely why Spain is resisting them.
The better model is what Scotland did: to take the decision on 
one question only, and if for secession, then build the institutions and 
negotiate before finally declaring independence. But the essential ele-
ment in that case, which is missing here, was the acquiescence of the 
sovereign state. That is what made it possible for Scots to deliberate, 
confident in the knowledge that if they chose to secede, there would 
be time to negotiate the transfer of powers, and from a position of 
considerable strength. The Spanish state has not accommodated the 
separatists in any way; the state’s recalcitrance has placed them in the 
difficult position of having to put their cart before their horse.
In thinking about this, we should recall the logic of the Quebec 
Reference, which considers the conditions under which a unilateral 
secession might merit recognition by other states. It is, the Quebec 
court tells us, a matter of good faith: if the seceding entity fails to 
negotiate in good faith, other states might not accord it recognition.17 
But equally, if the state itself does not in good faith take the seces-
sionists’ concerns and complaints seriously, the case for other states 
to recognize a seceding entity is stronger – and similarly, the fact of 
secessionists’ starting to build the institutions of governance before 
they have decisively broken away may be more legitimate if the state 
has not provided them meaningful scope for peaceful deliberation on 
the ultimate question.
In any event, nothing in international law prohibits secession,18 
and indeed nothing in the European Union’s legal order clearly does 
17. Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at ¶ 143 (“an emergent state 
that has disregarded legitimate obligations arising out of its previous situation can po-
tentially expect to be hindered by that disregard in achieving international recognition, 
at least with respect to the timing of that recognition. On the other hand, compliance 
by the seceding province with such legitimate obligations would weigh in favour of in-
ternational recognition.”).
18. In international law, secession is conceived of as a political question. See, e.g., Marcelo 
Kohen (ed.) Secession: International Law Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, New 
York, 2006); Susanna Mancini, “Rethinking the Boundaries of Democratic Secession: Lib-
eralism, Nationalism, and the Right of Minorities to Self-Determination,” 6 Int’l J. of Con. 
L. 553 (2008). At the least, declarations of independence are not contrary to international 
law. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403 ¶ (July 22), available at http://
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so.19 As a matter of Spanish law, it is not possible, but as a matter of 
European law – and values – it is probably a matter of indifference. If 
this were not the case, how should we understand the recent events 
in Scotland – more precisely, London’s recent acquiescence in those 
events? We would have to consider them as yet another example of 
the United Kingdom’s peculiarly distant relationship with the Euro-
pean Union; yet not once in the debates over Scotland’s referendum 
did anyone suggest that allowing a vote on secession was some insular 
opt-out from an otherwise mandatory European norm.20
Missing from the focus on the need to work within the Spanish 
context is any sense that Spain too might have some ethical obligation 
to take Catalan secessionists seriously and work with them. Anyone 
www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15987.pdf. (“State practice during this period [concerning 
Kosovo] points clearly to the conclusion that international law contained no prohibition 
of declarations of independence.”).
19. The Lisbon Treaty does provide that the Union shall respect member states’ role in 
protecting their own territorial integrity:
The Union shall respect... [Member States’] national identities, inherent in their 
fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local 
self-government. It shall respect their essential State functions, including ensuring 
the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding 
national security...
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union Art. 4(2), 2010 O.J. C 83/01. Thus 
Spain could plausibly argue that the other Union members have an obligation not to 
recognize the new state, perhaps also invoking the “sincere cooperation” principle of 
mutual assistance in Id. Art. 4(3) Id. However, this does not actually oblige the Union to 
take any position on a completed secession. Spain chooses to prohibit secession, but if 
secession nonetheless occurred, then, following the Quebec court’s logic of effectivity, 
it is not clear the Union or its members would be prohibited from dealing with the new 
state. Certainly, in international law, the norms for recognition of new states are so flex-
ible, so subject to auto-interpretation, that it is not tenable to declare, ex ante, that a 
factually independent Catalonia could not and would not be recognized; the moment 
would make the rule.
In any event, the official position in Brussels – for all the robust opposition to secession – is 
actually quite nuanced. See “European Commission did not authorize any official answer 
regarding Catalonia’s independence,” Catalan News Agency, 23 September 2015, http://
www.catalannewsagency.com/politics/item/european-comission-didn-t-authorise-any-
official-answer-regarding-catalonia-s-independence (discussing an apparent mistransla-
tion of European Commission President Juncker’s comment, in the official English, that 
“It is not for the Commission to express a position on questions of internal organization 
related to the constitutional arrangements of a particular Member State[,]” which in 
the curiously longer Spanish version included the comment that “The determination of 
the territory of a Member State is established by its National Constitution and not by an 
autonomous parliament’s decision contrary to that Constitution”).
20. See Timothy William Waters, “For Freedom Alone: Secession after the Scottish Refer-
endum,” Nationalities Papers (2015), DOI: 10.1080/00905992.2015.1101434; http://dx.doi.
org/10.1080/00905992.2015.1101434.
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familiar with the course of events there over the last ten years knows 
that, whatever one’s views, the Spanish government and constitutional 
court have been extraordinarily resistant to taking secessionist senti-
ment seriously; it is an opinion almost universally shared that, had 
the Spanish government shown any accommodation of the Catalans 
on this question as such, the whole matter would never have reached 
the critical mass that it did around 2012 and continuing to this day. 
Instead, official Spain has doggedly resisted, such that Catalans can 
argue – plausibly, whether or not correctly – that there is no longer 
any point pursuing their interests within the existing order.
The ‘need to work through and transcend history’ strikes me as 
a stirring phrase that utterly fails to explain what one ought to do in 
any given moment of what, in time, will turn out to be history too. One 
might as well say that Catalans are transcending history by challenging 
the Spanish state, and indeed – with the central role that the supposed 
injustice of whatever exactly happened in 1713 plays in Catalan national-
ist thought – 21 that is exactly what they think they are doing. 
Evidently working through and transcending history means ac-
cepting without question the political units history has bequeathed 
us, even though anyone with the most rudimentary understanding of 
negotiations theory would instantly grasp that treating the existing 
units as defaults will radically shape the outcomes one might work 
towards or transcend; in short, assuming the Spanish state radically 
narrows the set of possible outcomes. To say Catalans must transcend 
history within the Spanish state is simply to prefer Spanish national-
ism to Catalan nationalism, and we should have reasons – other than 
merely historical ones – for doing this. Yet the argument is only scru-
tinized on one side, because here we find one of those ratchets that 
so often operate in claims about what is right and what is possible 
when we think about states.
It is expressly this failure to deal with the Spanish state and with 
history that ‘disqualifies Catalonia and the likes morally and politically 
as future Member States of the European Union.’ Yet it is difficult to 
21. See, e.g., Simon Harris, “The Siege of Barcelona,” Catalonia is Not Spain: A His-
torical Perspective, 10 August 2014, http://independence.barcelonas.com/siege-
barcelona/#sthash.WGJnOUg9.dpbs (discussing the siege and subsequent dismantling of 
autonomous Catalan institutions, and arguing that by the end of 1714, “it is fair to say that 
Catalonia ceased to exist and that a new entity called Spain was created based on military 
subjugation and political, economic, and linguistic repression). Catalan nAtionAlism exhib-
its strong tendencies towards historical legalism – basing its legitimacy on claims about 
historical rights, although of course linguistic difference plays a significant role as well.
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point to something particular in the acquis communitaire in defence 
of this proposition. As a technical matter, it is probably true that Cata-
lonia (or Scotland, or any seceding region) would have to apply for 
membership – although in fact the Union treaties are not clear on this 
point, and it is surely possible to imagine defensible theories under 
international law in which more than one part of a dividing state could 
succeed to its treaty obligations.22
But quite apart from the technical question, it is hard to see why 
division of a current member is so destructive of the Union’s values, 
when divisions that closely preceded membership were not. The Czech 
Republic and Slovakia chose to defy the logic of human integration 
and refused to work through their own histories just over a decade 
before they joined the European Union, as did the Baltic states, Slo-
venia and, later, Croatia; Cyprus was admitted immediately after its 
Greek majority rejected a plan to solve its ongoing secession crisis. 
Why did this not disqualify them morally and politically? From the 
point of view of the state, it hardly matters whether secession hap-
pens before or after accession. So it is hard to see the difference for 
the Union either, unless the moment of membership is another one 
22. The Lisbon Treaty describes procedures for European states to apply for member-
ship, for member states to withdraw from the Union, and for states to rejoin, but says 
nothing about the secession of a section of a member state, let alone a section wishing 
to remain in the Union. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union Art. 49-
50, 2010 O.J. C 83/01. So, is there any way to consider a secessionist state as a continuing 
member? New states presumptively succeed to the original state’s obligations under 
humanitarian treaties; is it plausible to describe the European Union treaty architecture, 
at least in part, as being a humanitarian treaty? I think it’s a stretch, but the European 
Union has adopted increasingly clear human rights obligations, and the Union’s own 
most fervent advocates certainly conceive of it in moral and ethical terms. Moreover, 
when a state dissolves or divides, some of the new units can be considered continuator 
states, in which case they take on all general legal obligations of the original state, and 
it is by no means fixed in law which units those are. Almost everyone assumed that, had 
Scotland seceded, the rest of the United Kingdom would have continued as a member 
of the European Union – after all, it has most of the original state’s territory and popu-
lation and its capital – but there is no clear formula for determining the identity of the 
continuator state: Russia was declared the continuator of the Soviet Union, but Serbia 
was not declared the continuator of Yugoslavia, despite having a roughly equal share of 
population, in neither case a majority of the original state’s population. It is even possible 
for the majority of a country to secede, but how should that be handled? Like so many 
things in international law – and especially things concerning the identity and counting of 
units – there is terminal uncertainty, and that counsels for a generous view of a seceding 
state’s possibilities. I discuss the idea of majority secession in Timothy William Waters, 
“The Blessing of Departure: Acceptable and Unacceptable State Support for Demographic 
Transformation: The Lieberman Plan to Exchange Populated Territories in Cisjordan,” 2 
Law & Ethics of Human Rights 221 (2008), available at http://www.repository.law.indiana.
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1020&context=facpub.
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of those great ratchets that locks peoples into a whirring machine of 
ever-more-cosmopolitan integration.23
And as a matter of substantive law, there is almost surely no 
objection. Catalonia already is part of the European Union through 
Spain’s membership, and if there were features of Catalonian society 
or governance that made it unfit, they would likely make Spain unfit 
today. I realize I risk a tautology of my own, but here it is: If Spain, 
Catalonia too; and if not Catalonia, not Spain either. It cannot be some 
technical matter of the acquis – at most, a few chapters might need to 
be addressed (regarding institutions that only a sovereign state deals 
with, and which therefore Catalonia still needs to develop24) – so in-
stead it must be a matter of these defective values, the very attempt 
to secede, that renders Catalonia unfit. We have just seen how the 
circle of that argument closes to an infinitesimal absurdity. 
But as to the last claim, that this is a matter of ethics and values, 
which ought to apply to all such cases generally: I think we can all 
agree on that.
A Klee painting named Angelus Novus shows an angel looking as though he 
is about to move away from something he is fixedly contemplating. His eyes 
are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how one pictures 
the angel of history. His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a 
chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage 
upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, 
awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is 
blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that 
the angel can no longer close them. The storm irresistibly propels him into the 
future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows 
skyward. This storm is what we call progress.
– Theses on the Philosophy of History25
23. One suspects there is one circumstance in which it might be okay not to accept the 
state that history has given us: when transcending history might yield more integration 
into Europe.
24. Weiler acknowledges this in regard to Scotland, and it is difficult to see why it should 
be different for Catalonia – except for the bare political question of Spain’s agreement, 
but then that is the very thing itself: “there should be no legal impediment for Scotland 
to become a Member State if she satisfies the condition for Membership, political and 
legal, one of which is a unanimous decision of all Member States. On the technical side it 
should be a relatively easy accession, since the European legal acquis is part of the political 
and legal fabric of Scotland.” Weiler, “Scotland and the EU: A Comment.”
25. Walter Benjamin, Illuminations (Theses on the Philosophy of History) at 257-8 (Harry 
Zohn, trans., New York: Hartcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1968).
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2.
So let us now consider the matter more generally – more syntheti-
cally. As mentioned, I wish to show two things: first, that secession is 
consistent with European values; and second, that we have the means 
available in law and politics to give those values expression.
The first claim:26 secession is a form of subsidiarity. Subsidiarity is 
a principle concerned with finding the right level for decision-making 
and public authority. It arises out of Catholic teaching, but its most 
robust articulation has been in the European Union, as a way to dis-
tribute authority between the Union, member states, and regions.27 
Subsidiarity is a central principle of Union governance,28 so if secession 
can be understood as a kind of subsidiarity, it will be fully consistent 
with the European Union’s legal order and, presumably, European 
values.
Subsidiarity is typically thought of as giving preference towards 
decision-making at lower levels, and in the European Union subsidi-
arity is expressly defined in this way and includes formal decisional 
criteria.29 But in fact it has no inherent directionality, and can just as 
easily lead to upward integration, to centralization of authority, if that 
is the right level to get things done.30 Of course, to speak of the ‘right’ 
level is a fiction: Subsidiarity does not actually decide what the right 
26. This section draws upon concepts I develop at length in Timothy William Waters, 
“Shifting States: Secession and Self-Determination as Subsidiarity,” Percorsi costituzionali 
751 (3/2014), but the language here is new.
27. See Philipp Kiiver, The Early Warning System for the Principle of Subsidiarity: Constitu-
tional theory and empirical reality (New York: Routledge, 2012); Didier Fouarge, Poverty 
and Subsidiarity in Europe: Minimum Protection from an Economic Perspective 15-24 
(Northhampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2004)(surveying philosophical and historical origins 
of subsidiarity); Antonio Estella, The EU Principle of Subsidiarity and its Critique (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002); Renaud Dehousse, “Does Subsidiarity Really Matter?,” EUI 
Working Paper LAW No. 92/32 (European University Institute, 1993), at 2-9 (discussing 
origins of EU subsidiarity through 1992).
28. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union Art. 5(1) and (3), 2010 O.J. C 
83/01.
29. Andreas Føllesdal, “Subsidiarity and the Global Order,” PluriCourts Research Paper 
No. 13-04, at 1, forthcoming in Subsidiarity in Comparative Perspective (Augusto Zim-
merman & Michelle Evans, eds., Springer 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2359963 (“the 
burden of argument lies with attempts to centralize authority”).
30. Examples of this logic may be seen in recent calls for ‘more Europe’ in response to 
the demonstrable failure of the Schengen regime of open internal borders to cope with 
large migration flows – common policy at the European level, more powers for Frontex, 
and the like. But the alternative – dismantling Schengen and returning to more robust 
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level for any function is, and does not even tell us how to decide.31 The 
exercise of subsidiarity sounds like a technical matter, but in fact, like 
most decisions, it is political in nature: it is about choosing to assign 
authority to different social, economic, political or historical units.
You might assume secession is not an exercise in subsidiarity: 
After all, secession breaks a community, rather than redistributing 
decision-making within it. But in fact, secession is a redistribution of 
power between levels within the system we call the international legal 
order. Secession means escape from one state, but not from the state 
system – it repositions one community, formerly with the powers of a 
region or sub-unit (if that), at the level to which we assign the powers 
of a state. Whatever rights and obligations a state has, that unit now 
has, and has them in relation to other units.32 In our case, this means 
the relationship between Spain and Catalonia would be redefined, not 
as one of state to region, but state to state – and this would be true 
for the relationship between Catalonia and other states too. In this 
sense, independence is not just the devolution of power so much as 
the elevation of one community’s status in relation to the other parts 
within the system as a whole. Seen in this way, secession is entirely 
consistent with the logic of subsidiarity.
This becomes even clearer if we consider the question in rela-
tion to regional organizations, such as the European Union. Unlike the 
international legal order, it is possible to escape the European Union 
entirely – indeed, those who oppose Catalonia’s secession threaten 
that it would be expelled if it seceded. But this is a discretionary choice 
– a matter of policy and treaty design – and, as mentioned earlier, it 
would be entirely possible to imagine a different rule, according to 
which areas presently part of a member state would presumptively 
remain members under the same treaty regime. There is nothing in-
herent in secession that requires a unit to withdraw from a regional 
organization like the European Union.
border controls – is likewise a decision about the proper level at which to make decisions: 
both can be characterized as exercises in subsidiarity.
31. See, e.g., Gareth Davies, “Subsidiarity as a Method of Policy Centralisation,” in The 
Shifting Allocation of Authority in International Law: Considering Sovereignty, Supremacy 
and Subsidiarity (Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany, eds.; Portland, OR: Hart, 2008) at 79 (ar-
guing that subsidiarity does not act as a useful principle for resolving disputes between 
governance levels).
32. This is particularly clear if we consider that norms of customary international law au-
tomatically apply to new states – new states are immediately embedded in a pre-existing 
international legal architecture.
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Instead, secession reconfigures the political units within a re-
gional organization, but without necessarily changing the broader 
system’s substantive norms or the units’ relationship to the system. 
For example, the European Convention on Human Rights applies to 
Spain, and thus to Catalonia. Were Catalonia to become independent, 
the convention’s substantive provisions would apply, mutatis mutan-
dis, to the new state – because the ECHR is a humanitarian treaty – 
and its citizens would have the same rights they now have as Spanish 
citizens; their rights would not be affected in any way by a change 
in the units, other than having a different institutional pathway to 
Strasbourg through Barcelona rather than Madrid. This same logic 
would apply – or could apply – to relations between Catalonia and 
the European Union: Most of the Union’s substantive rules regulating 
social and economic activity are the same for all members and could 
apply to Catalonia if it became (or remained) a member. The addition 
of a Catalonian state would require adjustment to the Union treaties, 
but it would not significantly alter the law governing the Union.
What secession does change is the status of the sub-state region 
in relation to the other units and to the regional body.33 An independ-
ent Catalonia would have the same types of obligations and rights that 
units like Spain – that is, states – have, so obviously Spain’s relationship 
to Catalonia would be different, and so would other countries’. But 
this change is readily understandable as an exercise in subsidiarity: the 
assignment of certain powers of decision-making to one level rather 
than another. Conceptually, secession would read as a decision that the 
state-level functions within the EU system would best be exercised, for 
that region, by the region itself, now designated a state; it would be 
seen as an “attempt at redrawing the internal boundaries of the EU, 
rather than as a move away from the Union.”34 Subsidiarity is about 
finding the right level to govern people on territory; so is secession.
Catalonia would be a 29th unit, but nothing in its independence 
would actually distinguish it from the other 28 – indeed, when one 
33. It is worth recalling that secession would require changes in the treaties even if 
Catalonia were expelled. Voting rights are distributed by population, and Spain’s would 
decline. Provision would have to be made concerning the application of European Union 
programs on Catalan territory, and the rights of Catalans living in other member states. 
There is no way to avoid changes to the treaties except to reject secession altogether 
who would be stripped of the European Union citizenship.
34. Nico Krisch, “Catalonia’s Independence: A Reply to Joseph Weiler,” EJIL Talk!, 18 
January 2013, http://www.ejiltalk.org/catalonias-indepence-a-reply-to-joseph-weiler/ 
(referring to Weiler’s article as a “polemic” and “heavily misguided in substance”).
Timothy William Waters
REAF núm. 23, abril 2016, p. 11-45
28
puts it this way, it is hard to see how adding one more member to a 
club that already has 28 is a shocking departure from that club’s values. 
Whatever one’s preferred reading of the treaty texts, the ‘expulsion’ 
of an independent Catalonia is not required by the logic of the Un-
ion – certainly not one identified with both ‘ever greater union’ and 
‘being united in diversity.‘
3.
Secession may be an act of subsidiarity, but as we have seen, subsidi-
arity does not tell us how to decide any question; neither, therefore 
does it tell us why we should accept, let alone prefer,35 an independ-
ent Catalonia. Why exactly should Catalonia be a state, as opposed 
to some other unit: Spain itself, or Catalonia plus the Balearics, or 
Catalonia minus Barcelona? Subsidiarity doesn’t actually provide a 
decisional mechanism – it simply exhorts us to select the right level, 
without telling us what that level is. Even if we frame the problem as 
one of democracy, we face a conflict between two democratic claims 
– that of the Catalan community and the Spanish community. There 
are really two questions here: why a seceding community ought to 
have priority, and how to identify that community.
Fortunately, we have another mechanism – another language 
– that can provide us with a robust answer to these questions. Self-
determination – at least in its earlier, pre-classical formulation, dat-
ing from that same troublesome interwar period – offers a legal and 
normative justification for assigning governance to lower levels: that 
the lower level ought to have certain functions and ought to make 
the decisive choice itself. 
Self-determination is commonly thought to be related to ethnic-
ity or national identity – certainly its Wilsonian incarnation as a politi-
cal principle was seen in this way – but it is equally understandable as 
a democratic and territorial principle, recognizing that people live in 
places, and that those places matter in particular, politically relevant 
35. I do not prefer it – I am agnostic, preferring only those outcomes we can plausibly 
describe as expressing the legitimate will of a majority of some relevant political commu-
nity. At no point has the Catalan secessionist movement yet provided a proof of this will, 
and even the recent parliamentary victory of the secessionist parties in the September 
2015 elections did not bring a popular majority.
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ways to those people more than to others.36 Even under conditions 
of globalization, there is an irreducibly physical and territorial aspect 
to human political community, which at its heart is about governing 
people in relation to each other and to resources: Most people lead 
lives that are strongly centred in a particular set of places, and even 
the most cosmopolitan among us have centres of greater relevance to 
our personal, social, economic and political lives. Self-determination 
relates that fact to the value of giving autonomous choice to human 
beings living in close proximity to determine the political future of 
their shared places. This deference to people in the places they live 
provides a substantive basis for subsidiarity, yielding what the Jesuits 
might call a preferential option for the lower. As I have argued else-
where: 
Self-determination provides a normative basis for a community to claim a 
particular position in the distribution of authority at the international level. 
And the basis for this, consonant with democratic and human rights logic, is 
the assertion that individuals and their communities have inherent dignity or 
rights which law should not contradict, but support.37
Assuming, of course, we know what the lower level is and what 
it wants. One of the key objections to justifying secession through 
self-determination is that it is impossible satisfactorily to identify the 
self-determining unit. Here is a classic formulation of the objection, 
which identifies this problem in self-determination’s origins at the 
beginning of the interwar period:
A Professor of Political Science, who was also President of the United States, 
President Wilson, enunciated a doctrine which was ridiculous, but which was 
widely accepted as a sensible proposition, the doctrine of self-determination. 
On the surface, it seemed reasonable: let the people decide. It was in fact 
ridiculous, because the people cannot decide until someone decides who the 
people are.38 
36. For a modern territorial interpretation, somewhat different in its premises but re-
sponsive to this logic, see Lea Brilmayer, “Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial 
Interpretation,” 16 Yale J. Int’l L. 177 (Winter 1991).
37. Waters, “Shifting States: Secession and Self-Determination as Subsidiarity” (and quot-
ing Andreas L. Paulus, “Subsidiarity, Fragmentation and Democracy: Towards the Demise 
of General International Law?,” in The Shifting Allocation of Authority in International 
Law: Considering Sovereignty, Supremacy and Subsidiarity (Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany, 
eds.; Portland, OR: Hart, 2008) at 193, arguing that self-determination provides some 
democratic legitimacy in the international legal order).
38. Ivor Jennings, The Approach to Self-Government 55-56 (1956).
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More recently, Weiler advances the same argument, saying seces-
sion based on self-determination… 
…begs the question of who is the ‘political self’ that has the right to de-
termine whether or not the historical nation – even if composed of several 
peoples – will be broken up and secession allowed... There is no self-evident 
answer to this question.39 
That is true enough, but it is far from clear it is a dispositive 
objection. In many cases, there is a plausible, even agreed means of 
determining a priori the identity of the political self, because a territo-
rial unit already exists that is associated with an identifiable sub-group. 
This was the case for Quebec, for Scotland, for Kosovo, and now for 
Catalonia. When various actors can agree to consider an existing unit 
as relevant – as Canada and the United Kingdom did, and as many 
states (if not Serbia) have for Kosovo – the identity of the self-deter-
mining community can be assimilated to that unit.40 
But even in places that do not have a pre-existing political 
boundary, there is no reason to believe the question is really so dif-
ficult to answer. Human communities constitute themselves in many 
ways – civil society forms in an almost organic manner, political parties 
can form quite quickly – and there is no reason why political communi-
ties should not also. This means, in practice, that a claim for self-deter-
mination can plausibly be generated by actors speaking on behalf of 
a community, and whose legitimacy comes from general recognition 
by the community itself of their claim to speak. We know this can 
work, because in many historical cases, territorial units have been 
created to accommodate existing “social and demographic reality”, 
which means that it was possible to approximate the contours of the 
39. Weiler, “Catalonia’s Independence and the European Union.”
40. This can actually work against separatists, since pro-independence sentiment may 
not be evenly spread across the territory. Thus English-speaking parts of Quebec and the 
Cree-populated north were generally not in favour of secession; in Scotland, the Orkneys 
and Shetlands generally opposed secession; and in Catalonia, independence sentiment is 
stronger in the north than in Barcelona. Indeed, a pre-existing territory may have been 
devised with precisely the idea in mind of diluting ethnic or national concentrations: ar-
guably this was the purpose for the complex Soviet-drawn borders in the Fergana Valley 
of Central Asia, for example. And, of course, the existing unit may not contain all of the 
nation – as Catalonia does not, nor the Basque Country, nor Tibet – in which case seces-
sionists face a political choice. In Catalonia, the choice has been to rely on the existing 
unit, rather than some amorphous claim to a linguistically defined territory.
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community before any boundary defined it.41 The best answer to the 
objection is an Alexandrian one that cuts the knot of proof: The self 
that determines, determines itself.
Besides, it is itself unsatisfying to say, simply because there is 
no self-evident answer to this question, that we therefore prefer ab-
solutely whatever political communities happen to be lying about 
beneath the angel’s wings in the detritus of history. Unsatisfactory 
both in its lack of rigor, and because such a solution – the apotheosis 
of the status quo in se – treats the existing demographic distribution 
of power as a moral given, and in fact creates unsatisfying conditions 
for large numbers of structural minorities (structural, that is, only in 
relation to the borders we happen to have).42 Those conditions require 
their own justification.
The model of self-determination I have just described offers a 
pathway to justification, but this robust language is not the one we 
currently use.43 Instead, the dominant interpretation of self-determina-
41. Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at ¶ 59 (“The social and demo-
graphic reality of Quebec explains the existence of the province of Quebec as a political 
unit and indeed, was one of the essential reasons for establishing a federal structure for 
the Canadian union in 1867.”). To be sure, sometimes it is the unit that creates the demog-
raphy – this is the logic of Anderson’s ‘imagined communities,’ which form in response 
to the existence of bordered political territories that create bureaucratic and academic 
circuits between periphery and centre, share information sources, and succumb to the 
imaginative power of maps. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 
1991). But of course the idea is much older: Its logic is embedded in Massimo d’Azeglio’s 
lapidary utterance, “L’Italia è fatta. Restano da fare gli italiani” – “We have made Italy. 
Now we must make Italians.” Nothing in this essay supposes that political communities, 
including national communities, are anything other than social constructions; the point 
is simply that sometimes the construction of the nation occurs before the formation of 
its territorial unit.
42. See Krisch, “Catalonia’s Independence: A Reply to Joseph Weiler,” on this point.
43. For discussions of the dominant model of self-determination and criticisms of it, see 
Christian Walter, Antje von Ungern-Sternberg, & Kavus Abushov (eds.) Self-Determination 
and Secession in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Daniel Thürer 
& Thomas Burri, Self-Determination, in Rüdiger Wolfrum, Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Jure Vidmar, “Remedial 
Secession in International Law: Theory and (Lack of) Practice,” 6(1) St Antony’s Int’l Rev. 
37 (2010); Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Founda-
tions for International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2007); Marcelo Kohen (ed.), 
Secession: International Law Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006); 
Christopher Heath Wellman, A Theory of Secession (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005); Suzanne Lalonde, Determining Boundaries in a Conflicted World: The Role of 
Uti Possidetis (McGill – Queen’s University Press 2002); Diane F. Orentlicher, “Separation 
Anxiety: International Responses to Separatist Claims,” 23 Yale J. Int’l L. 1 (1998); Hurst 
Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: the Accommodation of Con-
flicting Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996); Martti Koskenniemi, 
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tion is Weilerian: fixated upon fixed borders as normatively desirable 
stabilizers, and therefore suspicious of, even hostile to, the idea of 
secession. It is an idée fixe – a foundation of our world order.
But what if it is wrong – as wrong in its assumptions and em-
pirical claims as it is misguided in its normative thrust? What if, in 
fact, borders increase conflict and distort democratic processes? This 
is precisely the question my larger project aims to address – to test the 
assumptions that underlie and feed this animus against secession or 
border changes of almost any kind, and consider the possibilities for 
an alternative rule to manage peaceful change.
4. 
I cannot possibly describe the argument in full here, so I will just sketch 
its outlines: note some of the existing rule’s contours and assumptions, 
then suggest an alternative and consider some of its advantages.44
The contemporary interpretation of self-determination – as 
a legal right (rather than merely political principle) founded in the 
United Nations Charter and central to the global order (see Appendix 
1) – provides that peoples govern themselves, but defines ‘peoples’ 
as the populations of existing states or discrete, non-self-governing 
territories. There are very few of the latter left, so self-determination 
is no longer a generative norm for creating new units – the so-called 
external form of self-determination. The only means of creating new 
states are as a remedial response to extreme persecution or denial 
of participation in the larger society – a rare category that requires 
considerable harm before it can be invoked45 – or in the event a state 
“National Self-Determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and Practice,” 43(2) Int’l & 
Comp. L. Q. 241 (1994); Lee C. Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination 
(New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1978).
44. Parts of this section draw on arguments concerning the assumptions we make about 
and the problems with empirically measuring territorial integrity rules that I expound at 
length in Timothy William Waters, “Taking the Measure of Nations: Testing the Global 
Norm of Territorial Integrity,” Wisc. J. Int’l L. (forthcoming).
45. This is the only circumstance Weiler would allow: “it is only under conditions of politi-
cal and cultural veritable repression that a case for regional referenda can convincingly 
be made.” Weiler, “Catalonia’s Independence and the European Union.” Remedial seces-
sion itself is a controversial doctrine. On remedial secession, see Jure Vidmar, “Remedial 
Secession in International Law: Theory and (Lack of) Practice,” 6(1) St Antony’s Int’l Rev. 
37 (2010).
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dissolves (as Yugoslavia did), in which case some internal candidates 
for statehood (such as federal units) necessarily have to be identified.46
In its internal form, self-determination continues to do genera-
tive work, promoting the internal democratization of existing states: 
each state’s entire population enjoys the right of self-determination by 
taking part in their own governance, and increasingly this has come to 
mean specifically democratic governance. Here too, sub-groups within 
the larger population may be identified as holders of autonomy or 
federal units, but this is discretionary; in general, a minority’s right 
to self-determination can be realized as an integral part of the whole 
population, within the borders of the existing state, and no state is 
obliged to realize it in any other way.47
The result is a system in which existing international frontiers are 
effectively fixed, and we assume this is a good thing. We assume it is 
stabilizing, that the alternative would produce uncontrollable fracture, 
as recalcitrant minorities would exit to form ever more, ever smaller, 
ever less liberal stateless that would descend into intractable violence. 
These assumptions prove quite difficult to confirm, however, since the 
same rule of territorial integrity obtains for the entire globe: it is quite 
difficult to know if present levels of violence, conflict, oppression of 
minorities and resistance to central state authorities are happening 
despite the current rule of fixed borders, or because of it.
All of these assumptions are quite vulnerable. The idea that 
states would endlessly fracture assumes every minority would eagerly 
seek to form its own state; this ignores the range of incentives to inte-
grate – common security, economic advantage, shared identity and val-
ues – which would not disappear just because exit became possible.48 
Nor is it clear that more and smaller states are necessarily a problem: 
there is no clear correlation between the size of a state and its pros-
perity or stability, nor is there any reason to assume smaller states are 
46. See Steven Ratner, “Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New 
States,” 90 Am. J. Int’l L. 590 (1996)(critically discussing the use of internal boundaries as 
international frontiers after state dissolution).
47. Indigenous peoples have a distinct right of self-determination that may require states 
to afford them high levels of autonomy, but indigenous self-determination expressly 
precludes any alteration to the territorial integrity of the state.
48. For example, there are still several small colonies that have chosen not to become 
independent because they value the economic and security benefits of belonging to a 
larger unit; and recently Scots voted to remain part of the United Kingdom, and with 
Scots on both sides of that question strongly favouring continued integration in the 
European Union.
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necessarily more illiberal; indeed, many secessions have been attempts 
to escape larger illiberal or repressive regimes. Giving minorities the 
option of exit surely would encourage some to leave – presumably 
a good thing from their point of view, since evidently they wanted 
to – but others would use that option to negotiate a better deal for 
staying, much as the Quebecois and Scots have done.
As for the risk of instability and violence, it is far from clear what 
the contribution of fixed borders is: do they in fact reduce violence? 
International, cross-border wars have declined dramatically since the 
Second World War, but internal conflicts have greatly increased.49 As 
I have argued elsewhere…
...even if the present rule has had an effect, it might not have reduced violence 
so much as redirected it from cross-border conflicts to internal conflicts. It is 
even possible – though just as hard to prove as the prevailing assumption – 
that the current rule has increased violence, by creating the conditions for 
groups locked inside the modern state to engage in all-or-nothing struggles 
for the control of states from which there is no effective exit.50
And when violence breaks out, is it because of the secession, or 
states’ resistance to it? Kosovo’s secession from Serbia was extraordi-
narily violent, and it is clear that the Kosovo Liberation Army purposely 
took up arms against the Serbian state, but that decision came after 
a decade of fruitless attempts to effect peaceful change in Kosovo’s 
status using non-violent means, attempts that had met only with in-
difference and coercion from Serbia. When the KLA took up arms, 
the Serbian state reacted with dramatically escalated reprisals and 
ethnic cleansing. So, in which ledger ought we to mark that violence: 
as an example of the dangers of secession, or the dangers of a system 
that permits states to use almost any means to defend their territory 
against the people living on it?
One way to evaluate the effectiveness of the current normative 
regime is to imagine what an alternative might look like and might 
actually do. I suggest an alternative (see Appendix 2) that directly 
challenges some of the core assumptions we hold about territorial 
integrity. Its central premise: create a single exception to the rule of 
territorial integrity – a right for self-identified sub-groups in a state’s 
population to make a claim to secede by organizing a plebiscite. The 
49. Lotta Themnér & Peter Wallensteen, “Armed Conflicts, 1946–2013,” 51 J. Peace Res. 
541, 544, Fig.1 (2014) (coding internal, international and other forms of conflict since 1946).
50. Waters, “Taking the Measure of Nations” (forthcoming)(emphasis original).
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group would define the territory on which the plebiscite would oc-
cur, but sub-groups within that area could make counter-claims in a 
cascading process (much as was successfully done in plebiscites after 
the First World War). The plebiscitary territory might have to meet 
certain standards, such as a minimum population (either an absolute 
number or some percentage of the original state’s population) and 
some contiguity of territory.
The right to secede would be a true right, not subject to proofs 
that the claimant group had suffered in any way – that is, not depend-
ent on some threshold of harm to invoke a remedial right to secede 
– and not based on any historical claim to the territory. The claimant 
population would not need to have a coherent ethnic identity – it 
need not have any identity at all; it only requires that a majority (or 
supermajority51) of the population on that territory clearly express a 
desire to form a separate state. In this sense, it is a radical expression of 
territorial democracy; it solves both the uncomfortable problem with 
Wilsonian self-determination – that claimants need a coherent ethno-
national identity – and the objection that there is no way to determine 
who the relevant political self is – because that is decided in an act of 
auto-interpretation vindicated through a democratic exercise.
The democratic quality of this changed rule is radical, but in other 
respects, the rule is quite conservative: no other norms of the inter-
national legal order need to be altered. The rule would encourage, 
even require significant changes in constitutional law in many states, 
51. This would be bad news indeed for Catalan separatists, who historically have never 
secured even a majority of the popular vote, including in the 2015 election (in which 
they secured a majority of seats in the National Assembly). Still, there might be good 
reason to insist on a supermajority: Secession is undeniably disruptive of existing consti-
tutional order, so it might make sense to assure ourselves that it is genuinely the choice 
of a significant majority in the relevant territory; many constitutional changes require 
a supermajority, and it seems reasonable to conceptualize secession as of at least the 
same order of significance. Moreover, the logic of a plebiscite whose territory is defined 
by the community itself presents certain moral hazards: an aggressive nationalist might 
claim much more territory than is in fact occupied by his nation, hoping to dominate all 
of it with a bare majority vote; requiring a supermajority would force such actors to self-
regulate their claims to ensure victory. A supermajority makes independence harder, but 
not impossible; some secessionist groups – in Kosovo and South Sudan, for example – have 
been able to produce very high supermajorities for independence. But a supermajority 
is by no means necessary: the Quebec Reference only speaks of a clear majority, and the 
recent Scottish referendum was conducted on the understanding that a bare majority 
would be decisive. Even that is proving difficult in Catalonia, but if there is any justifica-
tion for unilateral secession, in the absence of grave harms that require a remedy, it must 
be grounded in some claim about the will of the population in a given area – a local ter-
ritorial majority. It is hard to see why a mere parliamentary majority – itself an artefact 
of the existing political order, which the secessionists reject – should suffice.
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and the moment of secession would create an opportunity for interna-
tional regulation: new states might be required to commit themselves 
to extensive human rights protections in exchange for recognition, for 
example (as happened with states in the former Yugoslavia). But the 
main purpose of the new rule – the real change it would create – would 
be to shift the balance in negotiations between the state’s majority and 
sub-groups of the population: a right of exit would make it possible for 
sub-groups to negotiate a better deal for staying.
Such a rule would be undeniably more complex than the present 
rule, but then the problem we are seeking to regulate is itself com-
plex. And in many circumstances, the new rule would be more just: 
communities that laid claim to new states or negotiated better deals 
for staying would clearly consider themselves better off. Creating new 
states also creates new minorities, but logically, these will be numeri-
cally smaller than the ones we have now; unless we assign an absolute 
priority to the existing state as the normative unit, there is no reason 
to prefer its continuation. And there is an intuitive normative sense in 
recognizing that the enforced marriage of self-identified communities 
is no more justified than the enforced marriage of individuals. Declar-
ing that the people of the existing state – in this case, Spain – have 
an absolute priority simply reifies the existing state, which is the very 
thing a claim of secession contests. 
There is one certain effect of such a rule: it would, in the short term, 
increase instability. Change is destabilizing. But not changing is danger-
ous too – it is only that its dangers are put off, compounded, expressing 
themselves only after a period of drift. Drift can be more dangerous 
than active engagement to manage a country’s dissolution. Everyone 
knows the expression ‘grab the bull by the horns,’ but we rarely stop to 
think what it really means: grabbing a bull by the horns is extraordinarily 
dangerous, but you do it because the only thing more dangerous is not 
grabbing the bull by the horns; better now than later, because later may 
be too late. Unquestionably, there would be violence under this new, 
alternative rule – but there is violence under the existing rule, and the 
only relevant, moral question is whether there would be more violence 
or less. Besides, the benefits to stability could be significant: the present 
rule, in its rigidity, offers no option other than reinvesting in the existing 
state; a more flexible rule would give us broadened options for resolving 
conflicts in precisely those cases where options are most needed.
There is a tendency to view secession as a bad thing, as failure. 
But division is not a worst-case scenario; it is change. And it is fully 
consistent with European integration; if it can be achieved peacefully, 
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there is no principle, and no policy reason, that compels the European 
Union – which has long been vulnerable to charges of undemocratic 
elitism – to oppose it.52 We should not be insisting upon the states we 
have simply because we have them – we should subject them, too, to 
searching scrutiny; we should expect not only the secessionist, but the 
state, to justify itself in what Renan rightly called “the daily plebiscite.”53
Se vogliamo che tutto rimanga com’è’, bisogna che tutto cambi.
– Il Gattopardo54
So he drove out the man; and he placed at the east of the garden of Eden 
Cherubims, and a flaming sword which turned every way, to keep the way 
of the tree of life.
– Genesis 3:24 (KJV)
It will be said, in objection, that such a project is not simply 
dangerous – if indeed it is, if it is more so than what we now do – but 
worse than dangerous: it is idealistic. That charge has been levelled 
since Wilson’s day – his own Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, ex-
pressed his scepticism in just such terms:
The more I think about ‘self-determination’ the more convinced I am of the 
danger of putting such an idea into the minds of certain races. It is bound 
to be the basis of impossible demands. This phrase is simply loaded with dy-
namite... [The] fixity of national boundaries and of national allegiance, and 
political stability would disappear if this principle was uniformly applied... [it 
is] the dream of an idealist.55
52. Nor is this only true in Catalonia. Here is a recent assessment of Bosnia: “[T]he right 
structure can make Bosnia work. But other outcomes are possible, and disintegration is 
not the worst. BiH might reform sufficiently to complete EU accession but split peace-
fully.” International Crisis Group, “Bosnia’s Future,” Crisis Group Europe Report No. 232, 
10 July 2014, at 42. I have advanced similar arguments about the value of democratic 
principles in thinking about secession in the Bosnian context. See Timothy William Waters, 
“Assuming Bosnia: Taking Polities Seriously in Ethnically Divided States,” in Deconstructing 
the Reconstruction: Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Postwar Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(Dina Francesca Haynes, ed., Ashgate, 2008).
53. Ernest Renan, “Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?” [What is a Nation?], lecture delivered at the 
Sorbonne, 11 March 1882 (referring to “un plébiscite de tous les jours”); English transla-
tion at http://web.archive.org/web/20110827065548/http://www.cooper.edu/humanities/
core/hss3/e_renan.html.
54. Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedeusa, Il Gattopardo (1958); Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampe-
deusa, The Leopard (Archibald Colquhoun, trans., Pantheon 2007) at 26 (“If we want 
things to stay as they are, things will have to change.”).
55. Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal 316 (1995)(citing 
Robert Lansing, The Peace Negotiations – A Personal Narrative 96 (1920)).
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We have already seen – in the briefest sketch – why the kinds of as-
sumptions animating Lansing’s doubts may not in fact be true. Certainly, 
if we look at the list of ‘certain races’ Lansing was worried about – the 
Irish, the Indians, the Egyptians, the Boers of South Africa, the ‘Moham-
medans’ of Syria, Palestine, Morocco and Tripoli, the ‘Zionists’56 – they 
are almost all part of independent countries today, and we tend to think 
it better that way, for all the trouble ‘they’ might give ‘us.’ One is even 
a member of the European Union – in two parts. Wilson’s dangerous 
idealism looks like the order of things; now, it is Lansing who looks like 
the one holding onto a fading, impossible ideal, and an imperial one 
at that – an ideal about things always staying as they are.
And is that not, in its way, the same ideal the opponents of 
secession expound today? In warning against going back to ‘an early 
20th-century post-World War I mentality,’ they invoke the very period 
when Wilson proposed the new order that Lansing found so distress-
ingly, dangerously idealistic. Who here is fetishizing the state – and 
the state of things as they are: the Catalans, or the Spanish? Which 
is the vision that now informs the European project, or should? Is it 
Wilson’s ideal, or Lansing’s? 
When we reflect on what those most opposed to secession say 
our ideal ought to be, what do we see? With its posing of opposites 
and its categorical exclusions, its language of poison and betrayal, 
its scorn for those who cannot “stomach the discipline of loyalty and 
solidarity”,57 its genuflection before a dead past as the shaping order 
for the future, its insistence on unity coupled to threats of expulsion, 
its high moral tone and its biting anathemas, their ideal almost sounds 
like the very thing they most despise. 
So we should wonder: Is this truly the vision we wish for ourselves? 
Ever higher, all together, in the forms we inherit from the past – or be 
cast out! And how many will we cast out? That too is an ideal, yes, but a 
hard-edged one, a burning, purifying vision, rigid, austere and unyield-
56. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples 316 (citing Robert Lansing, The Peace Nego-
tiations – A Personal Narrative 96 (1920): “What effect will it have on the Irish, the Indi-
ans, the Egyptians, and the nationalists among the Boers? Will it not breed discontent, 
disorder and rebellion? Will not the Mohammedans of Syria and Palestine and possibly 
of Morocco and Tripoli rely on it? How can it be harmonized with Zionism, to which the 
President is practically committed?”).
57. Weiler, “Catalonia’s Independence and the European Union,” (“an independent Cata-
lonia predicated on such a regressive and outmoded nationalist ethos which apparently 
cannot stomach the discipline of loyalty and solidarity that one would expect it owed to 
its fellow citizens in Spain?”).
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ing – not the Garden but its guardian. It is the logic, not of Christian 
forgiveness, but of banishment, and it lacks those qualities of tolerance 
and true brotherhood that surely are Europe’s finest inheritance. 
Appendix: Two Rules of Territorial Continuity and Change58
1. The Current Rule – A System of Fixed Borders
•	 The	international	system	is	structured	around	norms	of	territorial	
integrity. These norms are expressed as formal, legal rules, but also 
closely reflect political practice.
•	 Existing	states	may	alter	their	own	borders	voluntarily	–	through	
cession of territory, merger, or secession.
– In so doing they may have to take into account the interests of 
the affected population.
•	 But	existing	states	have	a	nearly	ironclad	guarantee	of	their	ter-
ritorial integrity – their borders are protected against unwanted 
alteration, from without or within, in almost all circumstances.
•	 Self-determination	gives	the	populations	of	existing	territories	a	
right to self-governance: non-self-governing territories can become 
independent, at which point they have the same protections as 
existing states. 
•	 Increasingly,	self-determination	includes	a	right	to	internal	demo-
cratic governance, but only for the totality of the existing unit. 
•	 The	only	bases	for	creating	a	new	state	on	the	territory	of	an	exist-
ing state against its will are: 
– remedial secession because of
 . gross violations of minorities’ human rights; such as genocide, 
or
 . systematic and invidious exclusion of some group from par-
ticipation in the whole territory’s self-governance;
– or: total dissolution of the state
 . but even then successor units will, if at all possible, be drawn 
from existing territorial sub-units, rather than newly identi-
fied peoples.
•	 Law	and	politics	tend	to	analyse	divisions	of	states	as	voluntary	or	
the product of dissolution, rather than secession.
58. These schemas appear, in similar form, in Waters, “Taking the Measure of Nations” 
(forthcoming).
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•	 Groups	as	such	have	no	right	to	form	new	states;	the	normative	
structure is markedly suspicious of ethnically based claims to create 
new states.
2. An Alternative Rule – A Right of Secession
•	 The	assumption	of	territorial	integrity	can	be	defeated	by	internal	
claims by a self-defined community constituting a local territorial 
majority. 
•	 Such	communities	vindicate	their	claims	exclusively	through	a	series	
of internationally monitored or sanctioned plebiscites.
– The self-defining community itself determines the plebiscitary 
territory, subject only to these limits:
 . some minimum population,
 . some minimum contiguity of the territory, and
 . no claim that crosses an existing international frontier.
– Other communities within the territory can make counter-
claims, leading to a cascading plebiscite process.
•	 To	claim	for	a	new	state,	a	community	must	win	a	clear	majority	(or	
super-majority) among all those living in, or having long-standing 
ties to, the plebiscitary territory.
– Historical claims are given no weight, apart from recent acts of 
violent displacement.
•	 In	addition	to	winning	its	plebiscite,	a	secessionist	community	must:
– accept all residents of the territory as full citizens of the new 
state.
– undertake to respect all relevant human rights provisions, and 
– subject itself to ongoing international supervision.
•	 The	mother	state	would	be	under	an	obligation	to:
– allow and facilitate the plebiscite, and
– negotiate in good faith the seceding community’s departure, 
in the event the plebiscite succeeds.
•	 The	right	is	iterative	with	respect	to	any	territory	or	population.
•	 All	other	commitments	within	the	international	state	system	(hu-
man rights, non-aggression, succession rules, etc.) are unaffected.
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ABSTRACT
There is a strong animus against the idea of secession, which is seen as violat-
ing the integrative values of the European Union. This animus is misguided, 
which this essay demonstrates in two ways: first, that secession should be 
understood as an act of subsidiarity, and as such is fully consistent with 
European values; and second, that we have the means for realizing those 
values in international law and politics generally by using the language of 
self-determination – though not the contemporary doctrine, rather a radi-
cally democratic form: a right to secession. Beginning with a critique of a 
prominent attack on Catalan secession, this essay shows the problematic 
conceptual and moral underpinnings of the animus against secession; it then 
demonstrates the ethical and legal relationship between subsidiarity and 
secession, the usefulness of self-determination as a justificatory framework, 
the advantages of a radical right to secession, and the moral case for embrac-
ing secession as a European value.
Keywords: Secession; Subsidiarity; Self-Determination; European Union; 
Spain; Catalonia; Independence; Nationalism; Integration; EU Law; Interna-
tional Law.
RESUM
Existeix una forta animositat envers el concepte de ‘secessió’, que en general 
es veu com una violació dels valors d’integració defensats per la Unió Euro-
pea. Aquest sentiment és un error, com pretén demostrar aquest assaig. I ho 
fa de dues maneres: en primer lloc, defensant que la secessió s’ha d’entendre 
com un acte de subsidiarietat, i que com a tal, és plenament coherent amb 
els valors europeus; en segon lloc, perquè disposem dels mitjans per a la re-
alització d’aquests valors en el dret i en la política internacional a través de 
l’anomenat ‘dret a l’autodeterminació’ – tot i que no en la variant derivada 
de la doctrina contemporània, sinó més aviat en una forma diferent i radical-
ment democràtica: el dret a la secessió. A partir de la crítica d’un dels notoris 
atacs de què ha estat objecte el procés de secessió català, l’assaig assenyala 
primer els errors conceptuals i morals en què es basa l’animadversió vers la 
secessió; tot seguit, demostra la relació ètica i legal entre la subsidiarietat i 
la secessió, la utilitat de l’autodeterminació com a marc de justificació, i els 
avantatges del dret radical a la secessió. Per acabar, referma que la secessió 
és en la seva integritat, i de ple dret, un valor europeu.
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Paraules clau: secessió; subsidiarietat; autodeterminació; Unió Europea; Es-
panya; Catalunya; independència; nacionalisme; integració; dret de la UE; 
dret internacional.
RESUMEN
Existe una fuerte animosidad contra el concepto de ‘secesión’, que, en gene-
ral, es visto como una violación de los valores de integración defendidos por 
la Unión Europea. Ese sentimiento está equivocado, y este ensayo pretende 
demostrarlo de dos maneras distintas: en primer lugar, porque la secesión 
debe entenderse como un acto de subsidiariedad, y como tal, es plenamente 
coherente con los valores europeos; en segundo lugar, porque disponemos 
de los medios para la realización de esos valores en el derecho y en la política 
internacional mediante el llamado ‘derecho a la autodeterminación’- aunque 
no en la variante derivada de la doctrina contemporánea, sino más bien en 
una forma diferente y radicalmente democrática: el derecho a la secesión. A 
partir de la crítica de uno de los notables ataques de los que ha sido objeto 
el proceso de secesión catalán, el ensayo señala primero los errores con-
ceptuales y morales en los que se basa la animadversión contra la secesión; 
a continuación, demuestra la relación ética y legal entre la subsidiariedad 
y la secesión, la utilidad de la autodeterminación como marco de justifica-
ción, y las ventajas de un derecho radical a la secesión. Por último, defiende 
que la secesión es en su integridad, y de pleno derecho, un valor europeo. 
Palabras clave: secesión; subsidiariedad; autodeterminación; Unión Europea; 
España; Cataluña; independencia; nacionalismo; integración; derecho de la 
UE; derecho internacional.
